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BALANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH TO COPE 
WITH THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
Joe Chen 
Abstract 
Over the past several months, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated both industrialized 
and developing countries all over the world. By early late November 2020, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) reported a total of 56,261,952 confirmed cases and 1,349,506 deaths in 214 
countries.1 The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most serious public health crisis the United 
States has faced in decades.2 With millions of lives hanging in the balance due to lack of effective 
vaccines and medical treatments, governments and pharmaceutical companies across the globe are 
taking unprecedented measures to spur the development of vaccines and treatments for combating 
COVID-19. According to ClinicalTrials.gov, there are 3507 studies currently registered to 
investigate COVID-19.3 However, monopolies created by intellectual property (IP) protection and 
regulatory exclusivities can pose barriers to competition and impede market entry and scale-up of 
more affordable generic and biosimilar products critical for saving millions of lives. Given the 
magnitude of devastation caused by COVID-19 worldwide, this paper argues that there is a 
pressing need to adapt the present IP policy by reducing the barriers to ensure equitable and 
affordable access to essential COVID-19 vaccines and treatments for people in need. 
 
1 WHO, https://covid19.who.int/ (visited November 20, 2020). 
2 Brian Dean Abramson, Brief Insight: Preparing Health Care Providers for a COVID-19 Vaccine, J. Health & Life 
Sci. L., Vol. 13, No. 3, Pg. 2. 
3 ClinicalTrials.gov, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/who_table (visited November 20, 2020). 
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I. Introduction 
The right to health is a fundamental and universal human right.4;5 One key component of 
the right to health is access to medicines and health technologies.6 As stated in the Human Rights 
Council’s Resolution adopted in June 2011, “access to medicine is one of the fundamental 
elements in achieving progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 7  
The monopoly rights granted under patent laws and regulatory exclusivities have adverse 
impacts on access to essential medicines, especially for underprivileged patients in low-income 
countries. Prior to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, 
pharmaceuticals were not patentable in national laws of about fifty countries.8 In 1995, intellectual 
property protection started to be coupled with the trade because a prerequisite to become a member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is signing the TRIPS Agreement. Under TRIPS, patent 
protection to inventions in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals, is mandatory for a 
20-year period.9 
The outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1990s, which resulted in an estimated 65 
million infections and 32.7 million deaths10, highlighted the problems of access to life-saving 
 
4 The Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Articles 55-56, signed June 26, 1945. 
5 Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Treatment of the novel COVID-19: why Costa Rica's proposal for the 
creation of a global pooling mechanism deserves serious consideration?, J Law Biosci (June 2020) 7 (1): 1-10. 
6 Human Rights Council, Access to Medicines in the Context of the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, A/HRC/23/L.10/Rev.1. (2013) paras 5-10. 
7 Human Right Council, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development- The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health, UN General Assembly 2 (2011). 
8 See F.M. Scherer and Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing 
Countries, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health ,(2001) 4, doi: http://www.icrier.org/pdf/jayawatal%20.pdf. 
9 TRIPS Agreement, Articles 27(1) and 33. 
10 UNAIDS, Global HIV & AIDS statistics — 2020 fact sheet, https://www.unaids.org/en/resources/fact-sheet 
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medicines in developing and low-income countries and drew global attention to the conflicts 
between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the fundamental right to health.11;12  
The present COVID-19 pandemic, which has taken 1.35 million lives as of late November 
2020, has once again highlighted the need to address the tension between the right to health and 
IPRs.13 Due to its “winner-take-all” principle, patent law presents significant barriers to the rapid 
development of much-needed health technologies by disincentivizing the sharing of pre-patenting 
or unpatentable knowledge that could be valuable for drug discovery and development. 
In addition, exclusive rights lead to competitive pricing and restrict large-scale 
manufacturing across the globe, thus negatively impacting equitable and affordable access to 
innovative health technologies. For example, in the past decades, high prices for patented 
treatments have undermined countries’ capacity to supply treatments for tuberculosis (TB), 
HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, and cancer to patients in need. Also, it has been argued that unmerited 
patents on key technologies that block follow-on producers had delayed the availability of more 
affordable vaccines and treatments in low- and middle-income countries (LIMCs).14 Moreover, 
due to the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with 
reduced health budgets, the ability of governments to subsidize COVID-19 medicines and vaccines 
and the ability of patients to pay out-of-pocket has been significantly eroded.15 Thus, reducing 
 
11 Wolfgang Hein and Suerie Moon, Informal Norms in Global Governance: Human Rights, Intellectual Property 
Rules and Access to Medicines(2016) 45. 
12 MMWR, The Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 2006, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5531a1.htm. 
13 Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Treatment of the novel COVID-19: why Costa Rica's proposal for the 
creation of a global pooling mechanism deserves serious consideration?, J Law Biosci (June 2020) 7 (1): 1-10. 
14 MSF Access Campaign, A fair shot for vaccine affordability: understanding and addressing the effects of patents 
on access to new vaccines. 2017 Sep https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/2018-
06/VAC_report_A%20Fair%20Shot%20for%20Vaccine%20Affordability_ENG_2017.pdf. 
15 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Fair-and-equitable-access-to-
COVID-19-treatments-and-vaccines.pdf. 
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market monopolies and ensuring earlier competition will help to increase affordable and fair access 
to COVID-19 medicines and vaccines.  
However, the problems of access to life-saving medicines cannot be fully addressed by 
solely relying on voluntary commitments by phartmaceutical companies. In response to a petition 
by South Africa and India to the WTO calling for waiver or suspension on the granting or 
enforcement of any patents and other IP related to COVID-19 drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics for 
the duration of the pandemic, 16  on October 8, 2020, US-based pharmaceutical corporation 
Moderna, developer of one of the four front-running COVID-19 vaccine candidates, announced 
its decision to not enforce its patents on COVID-19 vaccine technologies throughout the duration 
of the pandemic and issue open licenses for the post-pandemic period. However, currently, 
Moderna is the only company that pledged to openly share its patents for the COVID-19 drugs and 
vaccines. In addition, Member States of the WTO have failed to reach an agreement that would 
have temporarily waived intellectual property rights for vaccines and treatments related to 
COVID-19 as the pandemic continues worldwide.17 
To achieve a better balance between private IPRs and public health, and to increase access 
to essential medicines to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper proposes an integrated 
approach that utilizes various policy instruments, including the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement. Part II provides a brief introduction to the IP system and the global IP framework as 
defined by the international treaties, e.g., TRIPS, and discusses how some of the IP practices and 
regulatory exclusivities become barriers to access to essential health technologies for fighting the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Part III discusses several policy instruments that can be taken at national, 
 
16 Raisa Santos & Elaine Ruth Fletcher, Moderna Makes Milestone Pledge To “Not Enforce Our Patents” On 




regional, and international levels, including: (i) restricting the grant of patent evergreening by 
applying stricter patentability criteria; (ii) restricting patenting of repurposed or combination drugs; 
(iii) reducing or suspending regulatory exclusivities (i.e., data exclusivity, market exclusivity) to 
facilitate rapid regulatory approval of COVID-19-related generic and biosimilar products; (iv) 
reducing or suspending patent linkage; (v) suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs; 
(vi) issuing compulsory licenses; (vii) invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS 
Agreement; and (viii) participating in medicine patent pool and the Open COVID Pledge. 
It should be noted that each of the above policy instruments has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and countries should tailor these policy 
instruments in accordance with their particular circumstances and needs. 
II. The IP Systems and Barriers to Access to Health Technologies 
The IPRs granted through the IP systems and the global IP framework, as defined by the 
WIPO treaties, the TRIPS Agreement, free trade agreements (FTAs), regulatory exclusivities, and 
patent linkage, are the primary schemes that give rise to monopolies of health technologies. 
Although such monopolies are believed to be important for driving innovations18, in many cases, 
they also constitute barriers to competition and delay market entry of more affordable generic 
drugs. A good understanding of the current IP systems and the underlying factors of the barriers is 
a prerequisite for formulating solutions to reduce or eliminate the barriers to ensure broad access 
to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. 
 
18 WIPO Magazine, Intellectual property, innovation, access and COVID-19, 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2020/02/article_0002.html 
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3.1. IP systems 
IP refers to a category of property, including intangible creations of the human mind,19 
such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. The fundamental goal of the patent 
system is to offer a mechanism to encourage the dissemination of technical knowledge.20 The 
patent system achieves this goal through a quid pro quo—in exchange for the exclusive right, the 
applicant is obligated to fully disclose the technical details of the invention to enable society to 
make and/or use the invention.21  
By providing rights to exclude third-party use of protected inventions, IP protection 
strengthens market-based incentives to invest resources for development and marketing of new 
technologies. 22  Such incentives are critical for research and development of new medical 
technologies due to the requirement of substantial investment of financial and technical resources, 
the high risk of failure associated with product development, and issues related to product liability. 
Generally, it is very costly to develop new medical technologies but relatively cheaper to reproduce 
or reverse engineer. Thus, it would be unsustainable for companies to invest resources and assume 
a significant risk of failure in product development and regulatory approval if their competitors 
are allowed to take a free ride. 
On the other hand, IP protection can be a barrier to competition by preventing entry of 
generic products. In addition, it can also impede further innovation by hindering access to new 
technologies. Further, the use of the exclusive right can contribute to market distortion and lead to 
 
19 See WIPO, What is Intellectual Property?, https://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/. 
20 Sean B. Seymore, Symposium: The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69 Vanderbilt Law Review 1455 
(2016). 
21 Id. 
22 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
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high prices of goods and market inefficiencies.23 Thus, IP policy needs to accommodate and 
balance various legitimate interests, including public and private interests, in a delicate way to 
promote public health.24 
3.2. International IP framework established by international treaties and free trade 
agreements 
3.2.1.  TRIPS Agreement 
The global IP framework is mainly defined by the treaties (e.g., the Paris Convention) 
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the TRIPS Agreement. 
Most countries in the world, including all the Member States of the WTO, are parties to the TRIPS 
Agreement. TRIPS, with the objectives of “the promotion of technological innovation and “the 
transfer and dissemination of technology,” mandates implementation of international standards 
that require IP protection to be available for inventions in all areas of technology (e.g., medical 
technologies) and protection against unfair commercial use for undisclosed test data submitted for 
obtaining marketing approval.25;26 Note that the global, multilateral IP framework, established by 
the WIPO treaties and the TRIPS Agreement, only sets minimum standards for the Member States. 
The Member States are free to implement more extensive protections based on their own national 
priorities and needs. 
In 2001, the Doha Declaration—a landmark declaration adopted by the WTO—reaffirmed 
the objectives and principles of TRIPS as guidance for implementing the TRIPS provisions in line 
 
23 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 




26 Article 7, the TRIPS Agreement 
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with public health policy. The Doha Declaration provides a set of flexibilities within the TRIPS 
legal framework. One of such flexibilities is compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing is when 
a government allows someone else to produce a patented product or process without the consent 
of the patent owner or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself.27 Specific situations in 
which compulsory licenses may be issued are set out in the legislation of each patent system and 
vary between systems. The situations in which a compulsory license may be granted include lack 
of working over an extended period in the territory of the patent, inventions funded by the 
government, failure or inability of a patentee to meet a demand for a patented product and where 
the refusal to grant a license leads to the inability to exploit an important technological advance, 
or to exploit a further patent.28 TRIPs also provides that the requirements for a compulsory license 
may be waived in certain situations, in particular cases of national emergency or extreme urgency 
or in cases of public non-commercial use.29  Article 31.f of TRIPS requires that compulsory 
licenses be used “predominantly” for local markets, a requirement that complicates the ability of 
countries to import drugs manufactured overseas.30 
3.2.2.  Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
Certain IP provisions in FTAs are of particular relevance to the health technologies 
sector.31 Those IP provisions in FTAs affecting the pharmaceutical sector include definitions of 
patentability criteria; patent term extensions (PTE) and other similar instruments; regulatory 
exclusivities; patent linkage with regulatory approval; and IPRs enforcement such as border 
 
27 WTO, Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm 
28 Article 31, the TRIPS Agreement, Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
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measures. In the past decade, many FTAs have also reaffirmed the Doha Declaration, including 
the right to take measures to protect public health.32 
When the TRIPS Agreement went into effect in 1995, there were 44 FTAs in force. By 
December 2019, the number of FTAs had surpassed 300, most of which contain IP provisions.33  
About twenty percent of the FTAs contain provisions requiring the parties to implement higher 
standards for protection and enforcement of IPRs than those in the TRIPS Agreement.34 Such 
provisions are generally referred to as “TRIPS-plus.” For example, some FTAs specify how to 
apply patentability criteria and disclosure requirements.35 Some FTAs contain provisions allowing 
the patent term to extend beyond 20 years to compensate for the time patent owners spend in 
obtaining marketing approval.36 While the TRIPS Agreement does not provide an exhaustive list 
of grounds for granting compulsory licenses, some FTAs, such as the United States-Australia FTA, 
limit grounds to situations of extreme urgency and public non-commercial use.37 
3.3. Barriers created by patent evergreening and second medical use patents 
A patent will be granted to an inventor if the invention is novel, non-obvious, and useful 
to a person skilled in the art. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “patents should be 
available for any inventions, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable 
of industrial application.” 38  Under the TRIPS Agreement, countries have flexibilities in 
determining how to apply the patentability criteria.  
 
32 Id. 
33 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Database, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
34 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
35 Id. at 71. 
36 Id. 
37 See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta 
38 Article 27, TRIPS Agreement 
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Companies often employ patenting strategies to seek new monopolies or prolong market 
exclusivity through, for example, applying for secondary patents on known medicines. Such 
patenting practice is known as “patent evergreening.” Evergreening, as defined by the 2003 WHO 
Commission on IP, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), is a term popularly used to describe 
patent holders’ use of various strategies to extend the period of exclusivity beyond the 20-year 
patent term, even absent apparent additional benefits.39 The commercial benefits of evergreening 
patents are significant. A study by Kapczynski et al. of the 1,304 patents on new molecular entities 
listed in the FDA’s Orange Book shows that secondary patent claims extended patent protection 
by an average of 6 to 7 years.40 
When a known substance previously used for a certain non-medical purpose is found 
effective in the treatment of disease, a patent application may be filed to claim the “first medical 
indication,” also called “new use” or “second use” of the known substance.41  If the known 
substance previously used for a certain medical purpose is found effective for another medical use, 
such medical use is called “second medical indication.”42 Article 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
permits countries to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals from patenting. 43  However, the TRIPS agreement does not address the 
patentability of the first and second medical indications, and national patent laws differ on this 
 
39 WHO, Public health, innovation and intellectual property rights, Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), ISBN 9241563230, Geneva, Switzerland 2006, p.131, 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/. 
40 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park, and Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and 
prodrugs and salts: an empirical analysis of “secondary” pharmaceutical patents, PLOS One 7, no. 12 (2012): 
e49470, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0049470. 
41 WHO, Public health, innovation and intellectual property rights, Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), ISBN 9241563230, Geneva, Switzerland 2006, p.131, 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/. 
42 Id. 
43 Article 27.3(a), TRIPS Agreement 
12 
point.44 Some jurisdictions (e.g., Argentina, Philippines) specifically rule out patenting the first or 
second medical indication inventions. Some other jurisdictions allow both the first and second 
medical indication inventions. For example, Article 54(4) and (5) of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC), as revised in 2000 (referred to as EPC 2000), state that the novelty requirement 
does not exclude the patentability of a known substance used for a new method for treatment or 
diagnosis.45  
The patentability of first and second medical indications is still a subject of debate, 
exemplifying the continuing challenge in patent law of balancing access against innovation. 
Opponents of medical indication patents express concerns that such patents can restrict access to 
medicines and reward uninventive activities and unjustly extend patent protection for medicines.  
3.4. Barriers created by regulatory exclusivities 
Regulatory exclusivities are conferred by national or regional law, which provide another 
mechanism of protection independent of IP protection. The period of protection through regulatory 
exclusivity may overlap with or be additional to the term of patent protection.  
Regulatory exclusivities include data exclusivity (i.e., protection of test data) and market 
exclusivity. Data exclusivity prevents regulatory authorities, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), from relying on the test data previously submitted by an originator (e.g., 
for a brand name drug) as reference data for approval of a generic medicine for a certain period of 
time.46 Market exclusivity, on the other hand, prevents regulatory authorities from granting market 
approval for a certain period of time. Unlike data exclusivity, market exclusivity prevents a 
 
44 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
45 The European Patent Convention, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html. 
46 Gene Quinn, Data exclusivity is not the same as market exclusivity, January 26, 2020, 
http://www.gabionline.net/Policies-Legislation/Data-exclusivity-is-not-the-same-as-market-exclusivity. 
13 
competitor from obtaining regulatory approval, even without referring to the test data from the 
originator.47 
Member States of the WTO generally grant exclusivity rights for a fixed period of between 
five and eight years, which can be further extended in some cases. The US provides a wide range 
of regulatory exclusivities, including five years’ data exclusivity for new chemical entities 
(NCEs). 48  As for new biological entities (NBEs) (e.g., antibody drugs), the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act provides twelve years’ data exclusivity and four years’ market 
exclusivity. In other words, a biosimilar product cannot obtain approval for four years after the 
date of the approval of its reference product, nor can it be approved until twelve years after the 
reference product’s approval date if it relies upon the test data of the reference product. In addition, 
to encourage firms to develop drugs to treat rare diseases and conditions (i.e., diseases affecting 
fewer than 200,000 people in the US), the US provides seven years’ exclusivity to orphan drugs, 
called orphan drug exclusivity. Gilead was caught in the controversy after it applied for and 
obtained the orphan drug designation from the US FDA in March 2020. Under the US Orphan 
Drugs Act, the orphan drug designation provides a seven-year market exclusivity in addition to 
tax and other incentives. Gilead was reprimanded for applying for such designation in seeking 
additional exclusivity “despite calls for solidarity” to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.49 After facing 
sharp criticism, Gilead announced that it had rescinded the orphan drug designation.50 
 
47 Thomas, J. R. (2014), The Role of Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
48 Thomas, J. R. (2015), Pharmaceutical Patent Law, 3rd Edition, Arlington (VA): Bloomberg BNA. 
49 DP Mancini, Gilead Criticised Over ‘Orphan Status’ for Potential Virus Treatment, Financial Times, 24 March 
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/9fea4f1c-6dba-11ea-89df-41bea055720b 




In comparison, the European Union (EU) uses a system of exclusivity called the “8+2+1” 
system.51 The EU’s system grants originator drugs eight years of data protection and ten years of 
marketing protection, both starting at marketing approval of the originator drugs.52 This means 
marketing approval for a prospective generic competitor can only be granted at the end of the ten-
year marketing protection period, which is extendable to eleven years.  
The granting of regulatory exclusivities, including data exclusivities, generally increases 
the expectation of revenues of bringing a product to market. Thus, in theory, it incentivizes 
development of new products at the expense of delaying the entry of generic products.  
3.5. Barriers created by patent linkage 
Normally, IP protection and regulatory exclusivities are two separate mechanisms of 
protection granted by different agencies independent of each other. Nevertheless, some countries, 
including the US, link regulatory approval (based on safety, efficacy, and quality) of a new 
medicine to its patenting status, which is generally referred to as “patent linkage.” In the US, patent 
linkage is statutorily recognized by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984, otherwise known as the Hatch Waxman Act.53 Under the Act, a manufacturer seeking 
marketing approval for a generic drug must submit certification to the FDA that its marketing 
approval will not infringe any patents of the originator on the reference drug listed in the FDA 
“Orange Book.” 54 A stronger patent linkage prohibits market entry of generic drugs until the 
 
51 WHA, Resolution WHA65.19: Substandard/spurious/falselylabelled/falsified/counterfeit medical products, 
https://www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/mechanism/WHA65.19_English.pdf?ua=1. 
52 WHA, WHO member state mechanism on substandard, medical products, 
https://www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/mechanism/A70_23-en33-36.pdf?ua=1. 
53 Kyung-Bok Son et al., Moderating the impact of patent linkage on access to medicines, Global Health. 2018; 14: 
101. doi: 10.1186/s12992-018-0423-0. 





expiry of the patent.55 An even stronger version of patent linkage prohibits consideration of the 
marketing approval of a generic drug before the expiry of the patent. Since TRIPS, the US has 
negotiated a series of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements having “TRIPS-Plus” IP 
provisions requiring trading partners to establish patent linkage mechanisms.56  
Not surprisingly, patent linkage has been found to have an adverse effect on access to 
medicines, by delaying market entry of generic drugs and enabling high prices of originator drugs 
by shielding them from generic competition.57; 58 It has also been argued that patent linkage places 
regulatory agencies in the role of enforcers of patents.59 Notably, some patent linkage provisions 
make no exception for generic medicines produced under compulsory licenses. Thus, such patent 
linkage provisions can unjustifiably extend exclusivity of originator drugs in the market since the 
regulatory agencies are unable to consider market approval of generic drugs during the patent 
period.  
On the other hand, originator companies and proponents of patent linkage argue that patent 
linkage is a reasonable means to ensure that the regulatory authorities do not promote infringement 
and that it increases transparency and predictability by identifying patents associated with each 
pharmaceutical product as part of the market approval process.60; 61 However, such arguments are 
 
55 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
56 Kyung-Bok Son et al., Moderating the impact of patent linkage on access to medicines: lessons from variations in 
South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United States, Globalization and Health (2018) 14:101, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-018-0423-0. 
57 Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, Sec 314.53 (d) When and where to submit patent information. 
58 Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, Sec 314.53 (b) Patents for which information must be submitted and patents 
for which information must not be submitted. 
59 Kyung-Bok Son et al., Moderating the impact of patent linkage on access to medicines: lessons from variations in 
South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United States, Globalization and Health (2018) 14:101, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-018-0423-0. 
60 Ho Cynthia M. The Globalization of Health Care. 2013. Beyond Patents; pp. 302–317. 
61 WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation - Second Edition, page 62. 
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not well-founded because adequate IP protection can be achieved through private enforcement of 
IPRs via the judicial system even if patent linkage is not available.62 
III. Increasing Access to COVID-19 Related Vaccines and Treatments 
Over the past few months, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated industrialized countries 
and developing countries all over the world. While several of the therapeutic candidates under 
clinical investigation as COVID-19 treatments are now off patent, other drugs being studied are 
under patent protection.63 With IPRs and regulatory exclusivities, pharmaceutical companies can 
control who can produce medicines and where they can be supplied. Furthermore, the lack of 
access to IP, data, and technical know-how impedes market entry and scale-up of more affordable 
generic and biosimilar products. 
To overcome the barriers of market dominance and access to patented health technologies 
and products needed for COVID-19 treatment, diagnosis, and prevention, countries can make use 
of a range of public health safeguards, including the built-in flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreements 
and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS. To this end, this paper proposes an integrated approach 
featuring several policy instruments that can be employed at national, regional, and international 
levels, such as: (i) restricting the grant of patent evergreening by applying stricter patentability 
criteria; (ii) restricting patenting of repurposed or combo drugs; (iii) reducing or suspending 
regulatory exclusivities (i.e., data exclusivity, market exclusivity) to facilitate rapid regulatory 
approval of COVID-19-related generic and biosimilar products; (iv) reducing or suspending patent 
 
62 Kyung-Bok Son et al., Moderating the impact of patent linkage on access to medicines: lessons from variations in 
South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United States, Globalization and Health (2018) 14:101, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-018-0423-0. 
62 Ho Cynthia M. A New Approach to Compulsory License Conundrum, in Patent Law in Global 
Perspective, The Globalization of Health Care. 2013. Beyond Patents; pp. 302–317. 
63 MedsPal: the medicines patents and licenses database, Patent status of selected COVID-19 candidate drugs in 
low-and-middle-income countries. https://www.medspal.org/?disease_areas%5B%5D=COVID- 
19+(drug+candidate)&page=1. 
17 
linkage; (v) suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs; (vi) issuing compulsory licenses; 
(vii) invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement; and (viii) participating in 
medicine patent pools and the Open COVID Pledge. It should be emphasized, however, that each 
individual instrument has advantages and disadvantages. If needed, countries should undertake 
these policy instruments in concert and adapt them according to nations’ priorities and needs. 
4.1. Restricting patent evergreening by applying stricter patentability criteria 
Patent evergreening is a patenting strategy pharmaceutical companies often employ to seek 
new monopolies or prolong market exclusivity. It is in the public interest of all nations to refrain 
from allowing “patent evergreening” through secondary patents derived from a parent patent by 
applying stricter patentability criteria. While excluding entire fields of technology (e.g., medicines, 
food) is no longer permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, countries can set more stringent 
patenting standards to meet the domestic needs of public health and economy. This will help to 
limit granting secondary and new use patents—a practice that often leads to patent evergreening. 
Under the present IP systems, whether to grant or refuse a secondary patent is judged based 
on its merits. It is important to determine if the secondary patent is separately patent-eligible. The 
mere fact that an innovation is incremental is not a ground for refusing a secondary patent claim. 
In fact, most innovation is incremental by nature. Some health policy-makers argue that therapeutic 
efficacy should be included as an additional criterion to restrict evergreening and that secondary 
patents should be granted only if the embodied incremental innovation provides sufficient 




in most jurisdictions, superior therapeutic advantages over the prior art may be considered when 
evaluating nonobviousness (or inventive step) of the product. 65  
In limiting patent evergreening, some countries have revised their legislation to adopt 
narrower patentability criteria. Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act 1970 and Section 26.2 of the 
Philippines’ Intellectual Property Code are two examples of a narrow definition of patentability 
criteria.66 Other countries apply different approaches. For example, many patent offices, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, the UK, the US, and EPO patent offices, have established 
examination guidelines for pharmaceutical inventions.67 The examination guidelines for patent 
examiners adopted by Argentina are along similar lines as Section 3(d) of India’s Patents Act 
1970.68 Thus, the goal of limiting patent evergreening can be achieved at both legislative and 
administrative levels.  
4.2. Restricting patenting of repurposed or combination drugs 
Second medical use patents are permitted for repurposed medicines and combination 
therapies in some jurisdictions, including the US. The patentability of medical indications is 
relevant to our fight against the COVID-19 pandemic considering many of the ongoing clinical 
trials are based on either repurposing or combining known drugs. Drug repurposing (also known 
as drug repositioning or therapeutic switching) is re-tasking an approved drug for the treatment of 
a different disease or medical condition than its original purpose of development. 69  Drug 
 
65 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
66 WTO/WHO/WIPO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (second edition), July 2020. 
67 See WIPO document SCP/30/4, Further Study on Inventive Step (Part III), available at: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_30/scp_30_4.pdf. 
68 Joint Resolution 118/2012, 546/2012 and 107/2012 (Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Health and National 
Industrial Property Institute) of 5 May 2012, published in Official Gazette of 8 May 2012. 
69 Wikipedia, COVID-19 drug repurposing research, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-
19_drug_repurposing_research 
19 
repurposing has been pursued to develop safe and effective COVID-19 treatments.70; 71 Several 
existing antiviral medications, previously developed for treating severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), HIV/AIDS, and malaria, have been 
investigated as potential COVID‑19 treatments, some of which are currently being tested in 
clinical trials.72; 73; 74 For example, the world’s largest COVID-19 clinical trial was launched by 
the United Kingdom (UK) to test repurposed drugs.75 In particular, drugs included in the trial 
protocol are all existing medicines repurposed for COVID-19, such as AbbVie’s Kaletra 
(lopinavir/ritonavir), commonly used to treat HIV infection; dexamethasone, an anti-inflammatory 
steroid; hydroxychloroquine, an antimalarial drug; and the antibiotic azithromycin.76  
Currently, there are eleven registered COVID-19 clinical trials for remdesivir alone. 
Remdesivir is an antiviral drug, which was originally developed by Gilead Sciences to treat 
Hepatitis C and was then tested against Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease, but was 
ineffective for all of these viral infections.77; 78; 79 It is thought that remdesivir may be beneficial 
for treating patients with COVID-19, and the FDA recently granted emergency use of remdesivir 
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during the pandemic.80 In January 2020, the Wuhan Institute of Virology applied for a patent 
covering the use of remdesivir as a treatment for COVID-19. However, such a move to claim 
patent rights over unproven use of the treatment, made in the midst of a rapidly worsening public 
health crisis, was heavily criticized.81 The need for claiming such patent rights was also questioned, 
since the national law implementing the TRIPS Agreement explicitly permits compulsory 
licensing.  
Given the fact that the candidate therapeutics of many (if not most) of the ongoing clinical 
trials are repurposed drugs, this paper calls on all countries to refrain from granting COVID-19-
related second medical use patents based on repurposed medicines and combination therapies. 
4.3. Reducing or suspending regulatory exclusivities 
Even if the patent on the original version of a drug has expired, it still may not be possible 
to bring a generic drug to the market if regulatory exclusivities apply. As discussed in the previous 
section, both data exclusivity and market exclusivity provide additional monopoly power 
alongside patent rights and can thus represent a significant barrier to equitable and affordable 
access to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. Hence, regulatory exclusivities can hinder global 
efforts to address the urgent need for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments in a timely and accessible 
way.  
Thus, regulatory exclusivities represent another area requiring quick action to facilitate the 
introduction of generic competition and to bring down drug prices. It is also high time for 
pharmaceutical companies, research institutes, and universities to share data and transfer 
technologies to treat COVID-19. Applications of generic drugs for marketing approval should be 
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encouraged even if they are based on the reference data submitted by originator drug producers. 
The present COVID-19 public health emergency should justify reducing or suspending data and/or 
market exclusivity, at least for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is also consistent 
with the Open COVID Pledge, discussed further below, which states, “The Pledger will not assert 
any regulatory exclusivity against any entity for the use of the Licensed IP in accordance with the 
license granted in Section 1, and we will not seek injunctive or regulatory relief to prevent any 
entity from doing so.”82 
4.4. Reducing or suspending patent linkage 
Patent linkage is perhaps one of the most debated aspects of patent policy around the world. 
Thus, it is a highly effective strategy for patent owners to shield their products from competition, 
delay entry of generic drugs, and extend market monopolies beyond the protection granted by the 
patents of the original product.83  
Considering the detrimental effects of patent linkage on access to medicines by delaying 
marketing approval of generics drugs and biosimilars and enabling the maintenance of high prices 
of originator products, there has been significant concern about its effects in LMICs.84 In particular, 
patent linkage also impedes the use of compulsory licensing, despite being recognized as a 
flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement.85 Thus, patent linkage mechanisms should be avoided 
where possible.  
Since many bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements (e.g., FTAs) have “TRIPS-Plus” IP 
provisions requiring trading partners to establish patent linkage mechanisms, it is recommended 
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that countries, especially LMICs, should ensure that exemptions of essential medicines to patent 
linkage are enabled for in domestic legislation. 86 ; 87  At the minimum, any patent linkage 
mechanism should be in harmony with other domestic medicines policies.88 In particular, there 
should be an exception to patent linkage such that it does not hinder the use of compulsory 
licensing.  
4.5. Suspending enforcement of COVID-19 related IPRs 
As noted in the Introduction section, Moderna pledged to suspend enforcement of its 
COVID-19-related patents until the pandemic ends. However, some commentators argue such a 
pledge is not enough to ensure broad access for everyone in need. 89  First, pharmaceutical 
companies are free to determine when the pandemic ends.90 Second, it is also argued that the non-
enforcement of IPRs is not sufficient without a commitment to share data, technical know-how, 
and biological resources needed for other manufacturers to produce the vaccine and to scale up to 
meet global needs.91  Finally, it is also reasonable to demand suspension of IP enforcement, 
especially considering many pharmaceutical companies had received a massive amount of public 
funds from the government without any strings attached. For example, Moderna has received more 
than $2.48 billion from the US government by far.92 
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Nevertheless, the pledge made by Moderna is an important step to eliminate IP barriers to 
vaccine development during the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, this paper calls on more 
pharmaceutical companies to make pledges to suspend or waive enforcement of IPRs on COVID-
19-related technologies, including drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics, at least for the duration of this 
pandemic. 
4.6. Issuing compulsory licenses in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic 
The TRIPS Agreement has various built-in flexibilities that allow governments to take 
measures to allow use by third parties of otherwise protected rights.93 The main flexibilities related 
to battling the COVID-19 pandemic include the compulsory patent licensing under Article 31 and 
31bis of the TRIPS Agreement and some exceptions (e.g., research exception, regulatory exception 
or “Bolar” provision, patent eligibility exceptions, e.g., excluding diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for treating humans or animals) for patents under Articles 27 and 30.94; 95 
Compulsory patent licensing allows governments to authorize the making, use, sale or 
importation of patented products and technologies by third parties without the consent of the patent 
owners. In some cases, the third party can be the government itself, which is referred to as 
“government use.” Compulsory licensing is an important attempt by the TRIPS Agreement to 
strike a balance between promoting access to existing drugs while promoting research and 
development of new drugs.96  
Compulsory licensing and government use of patents can only be employed under 
conditions aimed at protecting the legitimate interests of the patent owners. Generally, a 
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compulsory license cannot be issued unless attempts to obtain a voluntary license from the patent 
owner on reasonable commercial terms have been unsuccessful. 97; 98 However, voluntary licensing 
has several issues, such as lack of transparency and limitations in geographic coverage, which can 
impact access to medicines, although the step of obtaining a voluntary license can be waived for 
“national emergencies” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 99; 100 The Doha Declaration 
states that Member States maintain “the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” and that a public health crisis can be an emergency 
under this provision.101 The COVID-19 pandemic a public health crisis that has devastated many 
Member States across the globe, which should trigger the special accommodation of the 
flexibilities under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, including compulsory licensing without the 
need for seeking a voluntary license on reasonable terms.102 
It has been shown that compulsory licenses, where they have been granted, have led to a 
significant reduction of drug prices.103 For example, in 2012, the generic drug manufacturer Natco 
in India was granted a compulsory license for sorafenib, an anti-cancer drug and required to pay 
6% royalties to Bayer AG, sorafenib’s patent right holder and a German company. With this 
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compulsory license, the price of the generic version of sorafenib was reduced by 97% as compared 
to Bayer’s price.104 
Further, the threat of compulsory licensing can often lead to a positive outcome, such as 
voluntary licensing. A study by Beall and Kuhn identified 24 grants of compulsory licensing in 17 
countries for 22 drugs, only half of which actually resulted in compulsory licenses.105 This is 
because when countries signaled their intention to grant compulsory licenses, patent rights holders 
generally conceded with price reductions through, for example, voluntary licensing or discounts.106 
Several countries have announced consideration of compulsory licensing as part of their 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 107  For example, on March 19, 2020, Israel issued 
compulsory patent licenses allowing generic versions of AbbVie Inc.’s HIV drug 
lopinavir/ritonavir (brand name Kaletra) to be imported to treat COVID-19 patients.108 Under the 
pressure of invoking compulsory licensing provisions citing “national emergency” by the Member 
States of the WTO, Gilead recently signed non-exclusive voluntary licensing agreements with five 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to manufacture remdesivir for distribution in 127 
countries.109 
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However, compulsory licensing also has its limitations. First, the use of the patent is limited 
to the purpose for which it is issued.110 A government must make an attempt to obtain consent 
(e.g., voluntary licensing) of the patent owner unless there is a national emergency or other extreme 
urgencies, such as COVID-19. Also, if the compulsory license is issued based on a national 
emergency, it will be terminated when the national emergency is under control. In addition, the 
patent owner has the right to receive payment for use under the compulsory license depending on 
the circumstances of each case. However, determining the fair and reasonable payment (e.g., patent 
royalty) that the patent owner should receive will likely be a subject of dispute and delay. Further, 
if companies know that all their COVID-19 medications will be subject to compulsory licensing, 
they might have less of an incentive to develop the drugs or to enter into particular markets.111 
Nevertheless, compulsory licensing is a powerful public health tool, which can be 
instrumental in mitigating insufficient supplies of essential COVID-19 vaccines and treatments 
and reducing prohibitively expensive drug prices. 112  While currently there is no approved 
treatment for COVID-19, governments are legally entitled under the TRIPS Agreement to issue 
compulsory licenses for treatments authorized for emergency use. In particular, governments of 
LMICs should prepare to issue compulsory licenses of any effective COVID-19 treatments in 
anticipation of the needs of their most vulnerable populations.113 
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4.7. Participating in medicine patent pool and Open COVID Pledge 
The patent pooling mechanism can be an effective tool to spur drug discovery and 
development for control and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic. It acts as an intermediary or a 
clearinghouse to pool inbound licenses on a broad array of medical IPRs and research data from 
IPRs owners across the globe.114 The pooled licenses can be sublicensed on a royalty-free basis or 
on equitable terms to qualified developers or manufacturers. 115  Through the patent pooling 
mechanism, various IPRs owned by different owners are combined, which serves as a one-stop-
shop for all parties.116 Hence, transaction costs and risks will be substantially reduced. In addition, 
the patent pooling mechanism will facilitate the access to research data and collaborative 
innovation of relevant health technologies, thus accelerating response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The pooling mechanism can potentially increase equitable and affordable access to health 
technologies in these desperate times. Recently, a proposal for a global intellectual property 
pooling mechanism was proposed by Costa Rica, which received prompt support from the 
WHO.117; 118  
One of the important advantages of patent pooling is that it negotiates licenses from a 
public health perspective. 119 In addition, the licenses under the patent pooling mechanism are 
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transparent and predictable. All agreements are made available to the public on the organization’s 
website. This is an improvement over voluntary licenses, the terms of which are generally kept 
secret.  
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to negatively impact the world, a number of 
initiatives, such as “Open COVID Pledge,” have been launched to address the challenges 
associated with the sharing of IP and knowledge in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.120 
The Open COVID Pledge was developed by a group of scientists, lawyers, and entrepreneurs to 
encourage businesses and research facilities to make their intellectual property available for use in 
the fight against COVID-19.121 The Open COVID Pledge is aimed to encourage sharing of IP and 
technologies to combat and end the pandemic without the need for timely and costly licenses or 
royalty agreements.122 
The main concern for patent pooling and the Open COVID Pledge is the degree of 
participation by IPRs owners. IPRs owners devote a substantial sum of capital to develop their IP, 
with the expectation of recouping their investments through IPRs. Thus, it remains unclear how 
IPRs owners balance data sharing and open access to technologies against financial stability and 
potential legal issues that may arise from participating in patent pooling or the Open COVID 
Pledge due to IPRs owners’ legal obligations to their sponsors and other IP stakeholders. 
4.8. Invoking Article 73 security exceptions of the TRIPS Agreement 
To facilitate production and distribution of medical products to combat the COVID-19 
pandemic, governments across the globe are taking steps to bypass or override patents and other 
IPRs. The recent paper by Abbott et al. explores the possibility to invoke Article 73 (“Security 
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Exceptions”) of the TRIPS Agreement as the legal basis to override IPRs by classifying the 
COVID-19 as an “emergency in international relations.”123  Abbott et al. concluded that the 
COVID-19 pandemic can be considered an emergency in international relations under Article 
73(b)(iii), which permits governments to take necessary measures to protect essential security 
interests.124  
In supporting invocation of Article 73 security expectations, it is first determined the 
COVID-19 constitutes an emergency in international relations. Article 73 provides “Nothing in 
this [TRIPS] Agreement shall be construed … to prevent a member from taking any action which 
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war 
or other emergency in international relations ….” 125 One of the major issues in combating and 
ending the pandemic involves allocating medical products such as vaccines, medicines, personal 
protection equipment (PPE) among nations as COVID-19 is transmitted across national borders 
and affects people in many geographic regions. Under the present pandemic, the needs of LMICs 
for medical devices and medicines will not be met in a timely way. Thus, the allocation of scarce 
resources can be an issue of “international relations,” and a viable mechanism should be 
established to ensure equitable and affordable access to these resources.126 In addition to the 
allocation issue of scarce resources, other pandemic-related issues can lead to an emergency in 
international relations, including a significant slowdown of international trade and a deeply 
contracted economy.127  
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Abbott et al. concluded that overriding IPRs is among the actions considered necessary 
“for the protection of its essential security interests” under Article 73(b).128 Use of Article 73 by a 
WTO member to override IPRs or market exclusivity interests in medical devices or medicines 
will allow its domestic manufacturers or importers to use protected technologies of foreign IPR 
owners that are critical for fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Such use of Article 73 to override 
IPRs is reasonably and directly related to addressing the national security interest.129 
However, as with many other policy measures, overriding IPRs may face challenges based 
on national laws. Article 73 only addresses the challenges from another member in the WTO but 
not potential domestic law problems.130  
IV. Conclusion 
While IP laws and policy are crucial in incentivizing research and development of vital 
health technologies, they are far from perfect and may very well require further adjustment or 
reform to meet overarching public interests, especially when it comes to facing unprecedented 
global health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The monopolies established by IP 
protection and regulatory exclusivities have led to barriers to equitable and affordable access to 
essential drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics for combating the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple policy 
instruments can be employed in concert to reduce or eliminate these barriers to ensure broad access 
to COVID-19 vaccines or treatments for people in need. 
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